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SHOULD CONTRIBUTORY CYBERSQUATTING BE ACTIONABLE?  
 
Nicholas Foss Barbantonis* 
Domain name registrars are increasingly targeted by 
trademark owners for registering and hosting infringing domain 
names, despite the lack of clear statutory authorization for these 
claims. Registrars, pressed by reduced profit margins, have begun 
offering value-added services such as sponsored domain parking 
and WHOIS-masking. However, such services incentivize and aid 
domain name purchasers to engage in infringement. Existing 
scholarship on secondary liability in trademark law and 
cybersquatting is scarce and outdated. This Article provides a 
theoretical approach to the question of whether, and when, 
contributory cybersquatting liability exists. The Article argues that 
the relevant statute, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act (ACPA), was enacted against the backdrop of judicial 
precedent and Congressional intent to enhance trademark 
enforcement. By drawing upon the substantial case law 
undergirding traditional contributory trademark infringement, the 
Article contends that the motivations for including secondary 
liability apply to ACPA as well. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is an ongoing controversy as to whether the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) includes a 
cause of action for contributory cybersquatting for domain name 
registrars.1 Contributory cybersquatting’s basic mechanism entails 
an action to pursue cybersquatting caused by a third party’s bad 
faith domain registration and subsequent use of another’s mark. It 
is not the registrant (or the primary infringer) of the domain name 
who is challenged. Instead, it is the domain name registrar. The 
assertion of contributory liability is especially incentivized in the 
realm of Internet domain names. 2  Given that the registrars 
accounting for the majority of domain name registrations are 
multi-million dollar corporations, judgments against registrars, 
contrary to those against individual defendants, will also be easier 
to enforce.3 
Several earlier district court decisions have held both implicitly 
and explicitly that such an action is available.4 However, the 
situation took a dramatic turn in Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. 
                                                
 1 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012). A registrar is responsible for maintaining 
the registry, and is the actor that potential purchasers of domain names 
(registrants) contacts to reserve domain names. Examples of major registrars are 
Godaddy.com and domain.com. 
 2 This is because the potential efficiency of pursuing relief by a domain name 
registrar is much greater since they are generally easier to locate. This is 
discussed further infra Part II.D. 
 3 Michael J. De La Merced, As I.P.O. Nears, GoDaddy Tries to Show It’s 
More Than Just Domain Names, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/as-i-p-o-nears-godaddy-tries-to-show-it
s-more-than-just-domain-names/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (finding that 
GoDaddy.com, one of the leading registrars, reported $658.7 million in revenue 
for the first six months of 2014). 
 4 E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.Com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001); Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009); Microsoft Corp. v. Shah, No. C10-0653 RSM, 2011 WL 108954 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011); Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Above.com Pty, Ltd., 881 F. 
Supp. 2d 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
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GoDaddy.com, Inc.,5 in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded the opposite—the cause of action does not exist.6 
The issue regarding the actionability of contributory 
cybersquatting liability is not new. The issue has, however, 
become more critical as a result of the ever-changing registrar 
market conditions. This is especially true when considering the 
historical surge in domain name registrations and the prognosis of 
an ever-increasing poll of new top-level domain names (TLD) 
introduced by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN).7 Although the domain registration business is 
a multi-billion dollar industry, profit margins are shrinking due to 
fierce competition among the registrars.8 In order to maximize 
profit, several registrars have started to offer services outside of the 
core functions—registering and maintaining domain names. This 
Article focuses on registrar services such as sponsored domain 
parking and WHOIS-masking. 9  Both services are generally 
considered to be outside of registrar functions such as registering 
and maintaining domain names. Insightful scholarship is scarce 
                                                
 5 737 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, No. 13-1255, 2014 WL 1496428 
(U.S. Oct. 6, 2014). 
 6 Id. at 548. 
 7 What Does ICANN Do?, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/ 
what-2012-02-25-en (last visited Aug.17, 2015); see New Generic Top-Level 
Domains Announcements, ICANN, http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/ 
announcements-and-media/latest (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). 
 8 VeriSign’s Renewal Rates Improve For Q2 2015, TREFIS (July 24, 2015), 
http://www.trefis.com/stock/vrsn/articles/307215/verisigns-renewal-rates-impro
ve-for-q2-2015-while-it-plans-rollout-of-new-idns-and-a-fresh-round-of-price-hi
ke-for-net/2015-07-24; Brian Wu, GoDaddy Stock: GDDY Is Growing Like a 
Weed, But . . . , INVESTORPLACE (Aug. 6, 2015), http://investorplace.com/2015/ 
08/godaddy-stock-gddy-is-growing-like-a-weed-but/#.VdHuErKqpBc. 
 9 See infra Part II.B for an explanation of the services. Although several other 
services exist with categories arguably outside of “core functions,” this Article 
will primarily focus on the services: domain parking and WHOIS-masking. 
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and primarily deals with the outdated juridical landscape prior to 
the Ninth Circuit Petroliam decision.10 
This Article seeks to revisit the prior decisions and investigate 
whether contributory cybersquatting is constitutional. Although the 
Ninth Circuit is a heavy authority on intellectual property law, it is 
important to remember that the United States Supreme Court has 
never discussed the issue. This Article concludes that there should 
be a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting for domain 
name registrars. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Internet 
The International Telecommunication Union reports that the 
Internet currently has 3.2 billion users—about 44% of the total 
world population.11 There are currently a staggering 294 million 
active TLD registrations.12 Registrations have increased by 6.6% 
in the past years,13 making evident the domain names’ value and 
ever-increasing integral part of modern business and social life. 
Few could have anticipated such immense development. The 
considerable registration statistics do, however, have a backside. 
Indeed, it increases the potential for dispute between mark owners 
and cybersquatters. It all started in the mid-1980s when scientists 
                                                
 10  Christine A. Walczak, The New and Evolving Tort of Contributory 
Cybersquatting: Did the Courts Get It Right?, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 
531 (2012) (discussing why contributory cybersquatting has no statutory basis 
and as such is not actionable); Kurt M. Saunders, Is Contributory 
Cybersquatting the Next Front in Domain Name Litigation?, PENN. B. ASS’N, 
INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL., Spring 2011; Darryl C. Wilson, Battle Galactica: 
Recent Advances and Retreats in the Struggle for the Preservation of Trademark 
Rights on the Internet, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 23–24 (2011); Advising e Bus. 
§ 6:49. 
 11  ICT Facts & Figures, ICT, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/ 
Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2015.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2015). 
 12 The Domain Name Industry Brief, VERISIGN, Vol. 12, Issue 2, June 2015, 
available at https://www.verisign.com/assets/domain-name-report-june2015.pdf. 
 13 Id. 
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developed the Internet Protocol Suite (“TCP/IP”), which allowed 
computers to communicate across networks over vast geographical 
distances.14 With the implementation of TCP/IP, every computer 
connected to the network now had a unique, either statically or 
dynamically, Internet Protocol (“IP”) address.15 
For communication to flow between two or more computers, 
one needs to know the recipient’s IP address. The vast majority of 
servers visited by regular web-surfers have an assigned static IP 
address. This system is very similar to our current telephone 
system. As most individuals born before the 1990s can recall, it 
may be cumbersome to remember or bookmark every IP address. It 
is also challenging for corporations to market a particular brand 
through an IP address. This is further complicated by the fact that a 
given website IP may change for various reasons including 
switching between hosting companies. Corporations with large 
online presence, such as Google.com, Facebook.com, etc., cannot 
rely on a single server, however powerful, as it will not able to 
process all requests simultaneously. This issue is exacerbated by 
larger distances and increasing latency, inhibiting the consumers’ 
experience. 
To counter these issues, enterprises utilize a system that links 
several hundred servers all over the world to balance server load 
and delay. This would not have been practically possible without 
the Domain Name System (“DNS”). A DNS attaches a domain 
name to IP addresses. This gives two great advantages: the user no 
                                                
 14 Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society, 
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-histo
ry-internet (last visited Feb. 1, 2015). 
 15 The current main protocol, which is called IPv4, is an address containing a 
series of four numbers separated by decimals, i.e. 100.101.201.1. Initially the 
circa 4.3 billion addresses under the IPv4 (32-bit numeric address), which 
during its infancy seemed like a generous amount, are actually starting to run 
out. To counter this, the new IPv6 (128-bit hexadecimal numeric address), is 
currently being rolled out. In comparison, the new protocol has 2128, or circa 340 
trillion combinations. An IPv6 address looks like this: 
3ffe:1900:4535:2:200:f8ff:fe21:57cf. 
OCT 2015] Contributory Cybersquatting 85 
longer needs to know the IP address; and the host is no longer 
bound by a single IP address—it can simply update the connected 
IP addresses to the domain name. In today’s society, being readily 
available on the Internet is invaluable to any business. However, as 
will be discussed below, the advent of the domain name has also 
created the issue of people utilizing domain names that are similar 
to the trademarks of recognizable businesses with the aim of 
making an easy profit and owners of various marks 
(“cybersquatting”). 
B. Cyberpiracy 
Cyberpiracy is an umbrella term primarily covering 
cybersquatting and typosquatting. Cybersquatting is “the bad faith 
registration of domain names with intent to profit from the 
goodwill associated with the trademarks of another.” 16 
Traditionally, a cybersquatter would speculate by wrongfully 
registering several domains in the hope that they could receive a 
larger sum from the true mark holder to gain ownership of it. 
Typosquatting is a newer phenomenon, where the registrant 
registers multiple domains that misspell various marks in the hope 
that unknowing web surfers will enter their sites and generate 
traffic, either to sell their own infringing products or to front 
various advertisements of third party competing or infringing 
products and earn a given amount per click accumulated.17 An 
example of typosquatting would be aple.com, instead of 
apple.com. For both types of cyberpiracy, squatters have been 
found to misuse the marks’ accumulated goodwill by diluting or 
tarnishing the mark by redirecting traffic to sites selling infringing 
goods or services and adult or obscene third party websites. In any 
case, the mere act of denying the trademark owner use of the 
                                                
 16 Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 911, 915 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 
(quoting Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1099 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009)). 
 17 Christopher G. Clark, The Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003 and A 
Preventative Measure to Combat Typosquatting, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 
1488 (2004). 
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domain name in today’s society of e-trading may seriously impact 
the rightful owner’s ability to succeed. 
The ACPA, which was passed as an amendment to the Lanham 
Act in 1999,18 protects U.S. marks that are either registered with 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), or that 
are distinctive or famous.19 The statute requires the plaintiff to 
prove the domain name is identical or confusingly similar 
(dilution) and that the registrant has the “bad faith intent to profit 
from that mark.”20 The statute seeks to minimize shortcomings of 
the Lanham Act’s general trademark provisions, which requires the 
infringing use to be “in commerce.”21 The ACPA also intended to 
explain the shortcomings of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
(“FTDA”), which one commentator argued was a “circus among 
the circuits” as some circuits required marks to be nationally 
renowned, while some only required niche market fame, and some 
required actual dilutive harm.22 In 2003, the Supreme Court in 
Mosely v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. held that there was a 
requirement of actual confusion.23 Moseley was finally superseded 
in 2006 by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”), which 
amended the Lanham Act to require only a likelihood of 
confusion.24 
To vindicate a claim under the ACPA, it is no longer required 
that the mark be both distinctive and famous to be protected.25 The 
                                                
 18 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2012). 
 19 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (Both unregistered distinctive and famous marks are 
protected when considered recognized common law marks.). 
 20 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). 
 21 Id. § 1114(1)(a). 
 22 Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Blame It On the Cybersquatters: How Congress 
Partially Ends the Circus Among the Circuits with the Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J., 777, 777–813 (2001). 
 23 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 24 Trademark Dilution Revision Act Of 2006, Pub. L. No 109–312, 120 Stat. 
1730 (2006). 
 25 In 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A), the statute states: 
[W]ithout regard to the goods or services of the parties that person— 
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from . . . [a] mark . . . ; and 
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plaintiff is also not required to show actual dilution or a likelihood 
of dilution.26 Instead, the ACPA’s main function is to protect 
against “bad faith intent to profit.” 27 When determining “bad 
faith,” the statute lists a non-exclusive nine-factor list: 
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if 
any, in the domain name; 
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of 
the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that 
person; 
(III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection 
with the bona fide offering of any goods or services; 
(IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a 
site accessible under the domain name; 
(V) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s 
online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could 
harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain 
or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a 
likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or 
endorsement of the site; 
(VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain 
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without 
having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona 
fide offering of any goods or services, or the person’s prior conduct 
indicating a pattern of such conduct; 
(VII) the person’s provision of material and misleading false contact 
information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the 
person’s intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or 
the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; 
                                                                                                         
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that— 
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration 
of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark; 
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of 
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to 
or dilutive of that mark; or 
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 
706 of title 18 [the Red Cross] or section 220506 of title 36 [the 
Olympics]. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
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(VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names 
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of 
others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain 
names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the 
time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods 
or services of the parties; and 
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person’s domain 
name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning 
of subsection (c) of this section [Dilution by blurring; dilution by 
tarnishment].28 
The factors fall in two groups in which the first four suggest a 
lack of bad faith, and the last five are indicia of bad faith intent.29 
Not being able to find goodwill is not necessarily an indication of 
bad faith, and finding goodwill is not necessarily an indication of 
the opposite.30 The statute also has a safe harbor, which limits 
liability where “the court determines that the person believed and 
had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name 
was a fair use or otherwise lawful.”31 
Mark owners often face the challenge of a person registering 
identical or confusingly similar domain names. Excluding the 
hardship of regular trademark litigation, the challenge is two-fold. 
First, locating the registrant can be challenging because the 
database containing information about the registrants of domain 
names, the WHOIS records, 32  is often masked. A “masked” 
WHOIS is usually a legitimate registration by a proxy acting as an 
agent for the registrant to preserve the registrants’ anonymity 
                                                
 28 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i). 
 29 H.R. REP. 106-412 at 10 (1999); Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., 
Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 498 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e are not limited to considering just 
the listed factors when making our determination of whether the statutory 
criterion has been met. The factors are, instead, expressly described as indicia 
that ‘may’ be considered along with other facts.”). 
 30 S. REP. 106-140 at 8 (1999). 
 31 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
 32  WHOIS is a searchable database that lists all current domain name 
registrations. The database contains information such as the registrants’ contact 
information, and the date of registration and expiration. 
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against spam. GoDaddy.com is one of many registrars that offer 
this service. They will register the registrant’s information on a 
confidential database and put generic information on the public 
WHOIS database.33 GoDaddy.com now requires third parties to 
provide affidavits or court orders to reveal the registrant’s real 
information. 34  The WHOIS records are also often inaccurate, 
because registrars are not obligated to investigate the truthfulness 
of registrants’ information when receiving applications for domain 
names. Although some registrars implement so-called “click-wrap” 
terms of service requiring the registrant “to keep . . . [the WHOIS] 
information in a current and accurate status”,35 the practical reality 
is that it is sufficient to provide falsified information such as name, 
telephone number, and address along with a valid credit card 
number, which anyone can buy anonymously. This gives 
cybersquatters the opportunity to provide false information and 
hide their identities. 
Second, owners of famous marks in particular are prone to 
cybersquatting from multiple squatters who each register several 
domain names. Such scenarios force plaintiffs to file multiple suits 
against several different cybersquatters. This is both 
time-consuming and expensive. 
C. Secondary Liability 
The Lanham Act does not expressly mention secondary 
liability for trademark infringement. 36  Secondary liability 
comprises both participant-based and relationship-based liability 
                                                
 33  See GoDaddy.com, https://www.godaddy.com/domainaddon/private 
-registration.aspx?ci=92976 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (offering WHOIS 
masking for an annual fee of $7.99 per year per registered domain name). 
 34 See GoDaddy.com’s Domain Name Proxy Agreement, 
http://www.godaddy.com/agreements/showdoc.aspx?pageid=DOMAIN_NAME
PROXY (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
 35 See GoDaddy.com Domain Name Registration Agreement, 
https://www.godaddy.com/agreements/showdoc.aspx?pageid=REG_SA&isc=cj
c1hos1 (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
 36 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
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and is a purely court-created doctrine based on principles of 
secondary liability in tort cases.37 
Participant-based infringement refers to conduct in which the 
primary infringer’s injurious behavior is induced, contributed to, or 
facilitated by a secondary infringer.38 The main aspect of such 
claims is usually tied to the secondary infringer’s knowledge or 
lack thereof, and to the level of active harmful contribution.39 
Relationship-based liability is based on the principle of respondeat 
superior and focuses on the defendant’s control and accrued 
benefits due to the harm caused by the primary infringer.40 If the 
relationship between the defendants is close enough, courts will 
treat them as one.41 This Article will focus on participant-based 
liability, also known as contributory liability. 
The landmark case for contributory infringement liability is 
Inwood v. Ives.42 The case involved a generic drug, which the 
                                                
 37 See Inwood Labs. Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
 38 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Secondary Liability for Online Trademark 
Infringement: The International Landscape, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 463, 463 
(2014). 
 39 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26 (1995) (stating “(1) 
One who, on behalf of a third person, reproduces or imitates the trademark, trade 
name, collective mark, or certification mark of another on goods, labels, 
packaging, advertisements, or other materials that are used by the third person in 
a manner that subjects the third person to liability to the other for infringement 
under the rule stated in § 20 is subject to liability to that other for contributory 
infringement; (2) If an actor subject to contributory liability under the rule stated 
in Subsection (1) acted without knowledge that the reproduction or imitation 
was intended by the third person to confuse or deceive, the actor is subject only 
to appropriate injunctive relief.”). 
 40 Dinwoodie, supra note 38; Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 317 F.3d 
1121 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 41 Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services., Inc., 955 F.2d 
1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating vicarious liability requires the infringer and 
defendant to have “apparent or actual partnership” and to have “authority to bind 
one another in transactions with third parties or exercise joint ownership or 
control over the infringing product”). 
 42 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
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defendant manufacturer sold through third party pharmacists.43 
While some of the pharmacists committed primary infringement by 
selling the drug as the branded version, the plaintiff chose to 
pursue the generic drug manufacturer for contributory 
infringement.44 The U.S. Supreme Court held that: 
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to 
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one 
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially 
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.45 
The Inwood test is two-fold. First, one must find intentional 
inducement, and second, one must find a continued supply of the 
product, which the petitioners knew were infringing.46 The first 
prong is relatively uncomplicated as it simply includes an analysis 
of whether or not there is intentional infringement. The second 
prong, however, is less obvious. The second prong was elaborated 
in Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc.47 
The case involved counterfeit Hard Rock Café t-shirts, sold by 
various vendors at a flea market, and whether the flea market could 
be held contributorily liable for allowing such practice.48 The 
court’s conclusion was that the flea market could be held liable if 
“willfully blind” to the trademark infringement conducted by the 
vendors. 49  The court explained that “[i]n the absence of any 
suggestion that a trademark violation should not be treated as a 
common law tort” the flea market was “responsible for the torts of 
those it permits on its premises.”50 The question becomes whether 
                                                
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 849. 
 45 Id. at 854. 
 46 Id. at 855. 
 47 955 F.2d 1143, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 48 Id. at 1145–46. 
 49 Id. at 1149. 
 50 Id. 
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the owner of the premises “know[s] or ha[s] reason to know that 
the other is acting or will act tortiously.”51 
The flea market analysis was further expanded in Lockheed 
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.52 to also include services. 
The question then becomes whether the defendant has created a 
marketplace where infringement occurs and the degree of control 
and monitoring exercised.53 The court must also “consider the 
extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third party’s 
means of infringement,”54 and under this theory “a plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant had knowledge and ‘[d]irect control and 
monitoring of the instrumentality used by the third party to infringe 
the plaintiff’s mark.’”55 
With over twenty years of decisions finding contributory 
trademark infringement with no intervention by Congress, it is safe 
to conclude that contributory trademark infringement is settled law 
in the United States.56 
D. Secondary Liability Applied to Domain Names: Contributory 
Cybersquatting 
Applied to the realm of the internet, the possible advantages of 
secondary liability can be significant. Unlike in traditional 
trademark litigation where there is usually one or a few domestic 
                                                
 51 Id. 
 52 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 53 Id. at 984. 
 54 Id.; Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F.Supp.2d 
1098, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 55 Louis Vuitton, 591 F.Supp.2d at 1111 (quoting Lockheed Martin I, 194 F.3d 
at 984). 
 56 See Coach, Inc. v. Swap Shop, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278 (S.D. Fla. 
2012) (providing a clear picture of the state of the availability of contributory 
trademark infringement liability); see also Inwood Labs., Inc. 456 U.S. at 853–
55; Coach, Inc. v. Gata Corp., 2011 WL 2358671, at *6 (D.N.H. June 9, 2011); 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Adidas America, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 2007 WL 2915594 (D.Or. Oct. 3, 2007); 
Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1150; Coach, Inc. v. D & N Clothing, Inc., 2011 
WL 2682969 (E.D.Mich. July 11, 2011). 
OCT 2015] Contributory Cybersquatting 93 
defendants per case, the number of different registrants of similar 
domain names of any famous trademark might be in the hundreds 
and from all over the world. Registrants with masked or fake 
WHOIS data further complicate the matter. 
The benefits of allowing secondary liability is not restricted to 
the direct effects of each case because it also serves as an incentive 
for actors such as registrars to partake more actively in the cost 
associated with monitoring and enforcement of infringement. That 
said, if both pre-screening and subsequent response to trademark 
notices are reasonable, registrars should not run the risk of 
liability.57 There is nothing preventing registrars from conducting 
shallow domain and trademark searches to identify potential 
infringement. This may largely be automated by creating a script 
where the sought-after domain name is queried against national 
and international trademark databases. If the script detects possible 
infringement, it could be forwarded to a caseworker to make a 
preliminary determination of bad faith. Of course, this would 
induce an additional cost. Today’s dot-com domain name prices 
usually hover around $10 for the first year, and between $10 and 
$20 for each subsequent year.58 The price increase would likely be 
nominal and easily transferred to the consumers. If anything, the 
increased registration fee would function as an augmented 
threshold against cybersquatting. 
It is important to note the statements above clearly contradict 
the ACPA’s current safe harbor provision contained in 
§ 1114(2)(D). The provision shields registrars from monetary 
                                                
 57 Stacey L. Dogan, Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion: A Tale of 
Two Approaches to Intermediary Trademark Liability Online, 37 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 503 (2014). 
 58 Domain.com, https://www.domain.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) (showing 
the price to register a new dot com domain was $9.99 with a subsequent yearly 
price of $11.49 per year); see also GODADDY.COM, https://www.godaddy.com/ 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2015) (showing the price to register a new dot com was 
$2.99 per year with a minimum two year agreement with subsequent yearly 
price of $15 per year). 
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liability from certain registrar core actions. 59 As we will see 
below, there are multiple scenarios where the specific actions of a 
registrar may indeed render the provision irrelevant.60 In clauses 
(ii) and (iii), the provision explicitly lists actions—including 
refusing to register, removing from registration, transferring, 
temporarily disabling, or permanently canceling a domain name in 
in compliance with a court order—that, if taken by the registrar 
would shield those entities from monetary liability. 61  The 
legislative history states that this was indented to “encourage[] 
domain name registrars and registries to work with trademark 
owners to prevent cybersquatting.”62 
As with traditional trademark infringement under the Lanham 
Act, the ACPA has no specific mention of contributory liability.63 
However, there are several cases, which deal with the theory.64 
III. ANALYSIS OF CASES PRIOR TO PETROLIAM NASIONAL 
BERHAD V. GODADDY.COM 
This section discusses the several district court cases leading 
up to the Ninth Circuit decision in Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. 
GoDaddy.com.65 
                                                
 59 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D). 
 60 See e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 
2d 648 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (stating registrars are only immunized by liability 
when acting as a registrar, i.e., registering domain names for registrants). 
 61 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(i)(II) (exempting from liability “any action of 
refusing to register, removing from registration, transferring, temporarily 
disabling, or permanently canceling a domain name- (I) in compliance with a 
court order under section 1125(d) of this title; or (II) in the implementation of a 
reasonable policy by such registrar, registry, or authority prohibiting the 
registration of a domain name that is identical to, confusingly similar to, or 
dilutive of another’s mark.”). 
 62 See S. REP. No. 106–40, at 11 (1999). 
 63 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. 
 64 See supra note 4. 
 65 Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, 737 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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A. Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc.66 
This case involved a defendant website, Greatdomains.com, 
which specialized in domain name auctions.67 Greatdomains.com 
profited from commissions on sales conducted through its site.68 
The source of the controversy was a handful of domain names that 
included trademarks held by Ford. 69  Instead of pursuing the 
registrant, Ford sued Greatdomains.com for contributory 
cybersquatting under the flea market analysis theory, as 
Greatdomains.com had created the “necessary marketplace,” 
analogous to the Lockheed Martin Corp. case.70 
The court agreed that the flea market analysis could be applied 
to allegations of cybersquatting, but the court decided upon a 
heightened standard because, as the “ACPA requires a showing of 
‘bad faith intent’—a subjective element not required under 
traditional infringement, unfair competition, or dilution claims 
. . . .”71 The U.S District Court for the Eastern District Court of 
Michigan concluded that it would not be sufficient for a registrar to 
“merely [be] aware that domain names identical or similar to 
protected marks were being sold over its website.”72 This is based 
on ACPA’s safe harbor provision of non-bad faith uses, and unless 
the registrar “knew or should have known” of the registrants’ 
illegitimate reasons for registering the domain in the first place, the 
registrar should not be held liable.73 Thus, the court required 
“exceptional circumstances” for contributory liability to apply, 
because registrars “could not be expected to ascertain the good or 
bad faith intent of its vendors . . . .”74 
                                                
 66 177 F. Supp. 2d 635 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 646.   
 69 Id. at 635 (finding three domains created a high likelihood of confusion: 
4fordtrucks.com, 4fordparts.com, and lincolntrucks.com). 
 70 Id. at 646. 
 71 Id. at 647. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
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In Ford Motor Co. the court did not find “exceptional 
circumstances,” and dismissed Ford’s claim of contributory 
cybersquatting.75 
B. Solid Host v. Namecheap, Inc.76 
This case relates to a Dutch plaintiff, Solid Host, that lost 
control of its domain name, solidhost.com, after its registrar, 
eNom, had a security breach and a third party gained control of the 
domain and subsequently moved the domain to another account.77 
All traffic to the domain name was redirected to a temporary site 
claiming the domain was for sale.78 The temporary site listed an 
email address for information, and upon sending a domain transfer 
request, Solid Host sent a reply with a demand of $12,000. Solid 
Host claimed that defendant Namecheap, Inc. (“Namecheap”) 
should be contributorily liable, as it provided the service 
“WhoisGuard,” which listed Namecheap as the registrant, allowing 
the hijacker to remain anonymous.79 
Namecheap had refused to reveal its customer’s identity, even 
when provided with sworn affidavits by Solid Host’s owner, 
reasoning they wanted to “remain neutral,” and that the dispute 
was between Solid Host and the anonymous third party.80 
The court made clear that this case is not a typical 
cybersquatting case—in which the cybersquatter registers the 
domain name of a well-known trademark as a speculation—but 
squatting by hacking.81 Both types of cybersquatting, however, 
entail an effort by the squatter to ransom the domain name.82 
                                                
 75 Id. 
 76 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 77 Id. at 1096–97 
 78 Id. at 1097. 
 79 Id. at 1096–97. 
 80  Id. at 1098 (stating Namecheap eventually revealed the identity after 
receiving a court order directing them to cooperate with eNom to transfer the 
domain name to Solid Host). 
 81 Id. at 1102. 
 82 Id. 
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In determining contributory liability, the court looked to Ford 
Motor Co. 83  The three primary questions were (1) whether 
Namecheap sufficiently monitored and controlled the service; (2) 
whether Namecheap knew of the cybersquatting and; (3) whether 
the customer was doing so with bad faith intent to profit from the 
Solid Host mark.84 As to the first requirement, the court answered 
affirmatively, reasoning that the anonymity service “was central to 
Doe’s cybersquatting scheme,” and “[i]f NameCheap had returned 
the domain name to Solid Host, Doe’s illegal activity would have 
ceased.”85 As for the second requirement, the court stated that in 
Namecheap’s inherently difficult position, as a registrar, 
Namecheap could not be expected to monitor the Internet to 
ascertain a customer’s good or bad faith and, “that ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ must be shown to prove the degree of knowledge 
required to impose contributory liability for cybersquatting.”86 
Because Solid Host’s owners offered affidavits for the facts, the 
court did not accept Namecheap’s motion to dismiss. Thus, the 
court recognized the applicability of a cause of action for 
contributory cybersquatting, as the information provided probably 
“would have led a normal and prudent person to conclude that the 
domain it registered had been stolen.”87 
C. Microsoft Corp. v. Shah88 
Like in Ford Motor Co., the defendants in Microsoft Corp. 
registered domains containing plaintiff’s trademarks to divert 
traffic to their website.89 However, unlike in Ford Motor Co. 
where inducement was not an issue, the defendants in Microsoft 
Corp. also actively provided instructions to customers on how to 
                                                
 83 Id. at 1112, 1115; Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.Com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 
635, 646 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 84 Solid Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1115–16. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. (citing Ford Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 647). 
 87 Id. at 1116. 
 88 C10-0653 RSM, 2011 WL 108954 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011). 
 89 Id. at *2. 
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mislead consumers to enter their sites and to use Microsoft logos 
without authorization.90 Defendants also sold an emoticon-related 
software that incorporated Microsoft marks.91 The defendants did 
not “simply provide a marketplace where a trade in domain names 
may take place, as was the case in” Ford Motor Co.92 Rather, the 
defendants developed and marketed a method, of which “the sole 
purpose . . . was to allow purchasers to profit from the illicit use of 
Microsoft marks” by misleading web-surfers to think that they 
were browsing the sites of authorized Microsoft retailers. 93 
Interestingly, the court in Microsoft Corp. relied on both the “flea 
market” model set forth in Ford Motor Co., and Solid Host, in 
addition to traditional trademark principles for contributory 
trademark dilution as used in Inwood.94 
In analyzing the ACPA, the court found Shah’s conduct to fall 
“squarely within the statute’s goal of imposing liability on those 
who seek to profit in bad faith by means of registering, trafficking, 
or using domain names that contain identical or confusingly 
similar marks.”95 The defendants’ conduct of selling a method that 
teaches third parties about how to infringe on the core rights, 
against which the ACPA was enacted to protect, “should not be 
able to escape liability by interpreting the statute so narrowly.”96 
Finally, the court relied on Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, which 
makes clear that “it is a well-established canon of statutory 
construction that a court should go beyond the literal language of a 
statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose 
of the statute.”97 
                                                
 90 Id. 
 91 Id.  
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at *3. 
 94 Id. at *2 (referencing a similar case, Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 
76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)).  
 95 Id. at *3. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at *3 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 
(1983)). 
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The court found that the defendants could not hide behind the 
protection of blindness to the bad faith reasons behind the sales of 
the product.98 Because Microsoft Corp. dealt with a markedly 
more aggressive behavior—developing and marketing a tool 
helping its customers to infringe on the Microsoft marks through 
its marketplace—the defendants’ conduct satisfied the elevated bad 
faith standard from Ford Motor Co. as the “cyber-landlord” had 
reason to know that its “vendors [were] utilizing the marketplace 
for domain names” with no “legitimate purpose.”99 
In finding contributory infringement, the court took a more 
cautious road than previous courts and relied on the Ninth Circuit 
decision, DSPT International v. Nahum.100 The defendant in DSPT 
used the plaintiff’s mark to gain an advantage in bargaining for 
money that was arguably owed to him.101 The court held that even 
though the ACPA was enacted to stop cybersquatters registering 
hundreds of domain names, the statute “is written more broadly 
than what may have been the political catalyst that got it passed.”102 
Thus, the court interpreted the Act broadly to include such bad 
faith use. 
D. Verizon California, Inc. v. Above.com103 
Above.com, an ICANN accredited domain name registrar,104 
offered (and still offers) so-called WHOIS privacy services and 
                                                
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at *2. 
 100 Id. at *3 (citing DSPT International v. Nahum, No. 08–55062 2010 WL 
4227883 *3 (9th Cir. Oct 27, 2010) (holding that defendant had used plaintiff’s 
mark to gain leverage in bargaining for money that someone arguably owed to 
him)).  
 101 Id. at *8. 
 102 Id. (quoting DSPT International, No. 08–55062 at *3). 
 103 Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Above.com Pty, Ltd., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (C.D. Cal. 
2011). 
 104  See How to Become a Registrar, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/ 
resources/pages/accreditation-2012-02-25-en (last visited April 15, 2015). 
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domain parking services.105 Ten unknown “John Does” registered 
over a hundred domain name variants and typographically 
erroneous106—yet similar—domain names to Verizon and other 
famous-mark holders through Above.com.107 Although it is clear 
that a registrar cannot be held liable for merely registering domain 
names, 108  the offering of WHOIS privacy and domain 
parking—both of which increased Above.com income per domain 
name—incentivized the registrants to register domain names with 
bad faith intent to profit to generate domain names similar to 
famous marks. The reason for this is that the parked sites display 
various related advertisements, which in turn pay a certain amount 
per click to the registrant. In short, the similar domain name lures 
unknowing consumers to the site, which generates traffic and 
subsequent clicks. 
Because the court found that a registrar’s registration of a 
domain name implicates a service, it relied on Lockheed Martin 
Corp.’s extent of control and monitoring of the instrumentality 
used by the Does to infringe on the marks.109 It further agreed with 
Ford Motor Co. and Solid Host that bad faith intent to profit must 
be demonstrated by the existence of exceptional circumstances.110 
As direct liability had been properly alleged for the domain names 
                                                
 105 Verizon Cal., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 
 106 This practice is also known as “Typo-squatting.”  
 107  Verizon Cal., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at n.2. The court found that 
“Defendants have registered ‘‘www.ver9izon.com,’’ ‘‘www.veri9zon.com,’’and 
‘‘www.verizo9n.com.’’ On a standard computer keyboard, the ‘‘9’’ key 
straddles the ‘‘i’’ and ‘‘o’’ keys; thus, a consumer might mistakenly hit the ‘‘9’’ 
while typing in ‘‘www.verizon.com’’ and inadvertently visit one of Defendants’ 
sites, rather than Verizon’s.” Id. at n.1. 
 108 See id. 
 109 Id. at 1180 (quoting Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 
194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 110 Id.; Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.Com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001); see also Solid Host v. Namecheap Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 
1116 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding “‘exceptional circumstances’ must be shown to 
prove the degree of knowledge required to impose contributory liability for 
cybersquatting”). 
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in question, the case turned on whether the facts presented 
“plausibly demonstrate the exceptional circumstances necessary to 
show that the defendants knew or should have known that the 
registrants were violating the ACPA in bad faith.” 111  The 
defendants both controlled and monitored the privacy and parking 
services, and knew that the services were used to cybersquat on 
plaintiff’s famous marks. 112 Furthermore, both services clearly 
incentivize registrants to cybersquat, who “should have been 
aware” that they could be used for cybersquatting.113 Further, the 
service had already been subject to “nearly 200 UDRP 
cybersquatting complaints.”114 
In determining the availability of ACPA contributory 
cybersquatting liability, the court looked to all three previously 
mentioned cases, all of which either expressly confirmed the 
existence of such an action, or at least suggested that contributory 
liability may exist. 115  Unlike the previous cases, the court in 
Verizon California made an effort to mention the most 
fundamental step in any legal analysis, which is always to “look to 
                                                
 111 Verizon Cal., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id.; see § 4 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (1999), 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en (UDRP is a 
mandatory administrative proceeding for all gTLD, and some ccTLD disputes 
for complaints regarding domain registrations that “(i) . . . is identical or 
confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has 
rights;” and the registrant has (ii) “no rights or legitimate interests in respect of 
the domain,” and (iii) the domain “has been registered and is being used in bad 
faith.”); see, e.g., WIPO Guide to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy (UDRP), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide/#a1 
(UDRP proceedings are generally faster and more inexpensive than regular 
procedure). 
 115 See Microsoft Corp. v. Shah, No. C10–0653 RSM, 2011 WL 108954, at 
*1–*3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011); Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. 
Supp. 2d 1092, 1111–17 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Ford Motor Co. v. 
Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 646–47 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
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the statute’s text.”116 The court reiterated that the ACPA does not 
“expressly [recognize] nor expressly prohibit . . . claim[s] for 
contributory cybersquatting.” 117  Contributory liability for 
trademark infringement already existed and continues to exist, and 
like under the ACPA, is a purely judicially created doctrine 
derived from the common law of torts.118 As such, the court based 
its further discussion on the Supreme Court case United States v. 
Texas, 119  which held that it is presumed that when a statute 
“invade[s] the common law[, to] ‘favor . . . the retention of 
long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory 
purpose to the contrary is evident.’”120 The court concluded that 
“[a]gainst this backdrop, Congress codified the ACPA as an 
extension of trademark law because the problems created by 
cybersquatting did not fit neatly into traditional trademark 
principles.”121 
The ACPA was introduced with the aim of combating 
cybersquatters operating outside the realm of commerce. The court 
concluded that Congress must have been aware of the contributory 
trademark infringement standards set in common law, and without 
an “expressed legislative desire to the contrary, the ACPA carried 
forward traditional common law principles attendant to trademark 
rights.”122 It did not matter, for the sake of applying contributory 
liability, that the ACPA (unlike the Lanham Act) requires proof of 
bad faith intent to profit.123 Requiring such proof automatically 
                                                
 116 Verizon Cal., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (citing Hawaii v. Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 173–75 (2009)). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 1177 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 104 (2d 
Cir. 2010)). 
 119 Id. (quoting U.S. v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)). 
 120 Id. at 1176–77 (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 
(1952) and Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 
108, (1991)). 
 121 Id.; see also S. REP. No. 106–140, at 4 (1999). 
 122 Verizon Cal., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1177–78. 
 123 Id. at 1178. 
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raises the bar for imposing liability.124 This heightened standard 
fits squarely in the present scenario because for the registrar to be 
liable, it is not enough that it is aware of a similar domain name, it 
must also know that the domain is registered in bad faith.125 This, 
in turn, presents a stricter rule than for contributory trademark 
infringement. Although the defendant pointed to legislative history 
which indicates that the ACPA was intended to be narrow, 
contributory liability is “sufficiently cabined by the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ requirement to prevent the imposition of liability in 
contravention of the intent of the statute.”126 
In other words, according to the court, no innocent registrar, 
irrespective of offering WHOIS-masking and domain parking 
services, may be held liable for a registrant’s bad faith domain 
name registration.127 
IV. ANALYSIS OF PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD V. 
GODADDY.COM, INC. 
Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc. was 
presented to the Ninth Circuit appellate court by plaintiff-appellant 
Petroliam Nasional Berhad (“Petronas”), after the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California granted summary 
judgment in favor of registrar GoDaddy.com, holding that the 
ACPA did not include a cause of action for contributory 
cybersquatting.128 The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 
One or more “John Does” had registered the domain names 
petronastower.net and petronastowers.net with a third party 
registrar in 2003.129 The underlying issue evolved around the 
                                                
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 1179. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 856 (N.D. Cal. 
2012), aff’d, 737 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 13-1255, 2014 WL 
1496428 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014). 
 129 Id. at 548. 
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Does’ transferal of the domain names to GoDaddy.com in 2007 
and subsequent utilization of the GoDaddy.com WHOIS 
anonymization service and domain parking service. This allowed 
the Does to point the domain names to a pornographic website 
hosted by a third party webhost.130 
In determining whether the ACPA includes a cause of action 
for contributory cybersquatting, the court based its analysis on 
three main questions: (1) whether the plain text of the ACPA 
provides a cause of action and whether this was Congress’ intent; 
(2) whether ACPA created a new and distinct cause of action; and 
(3) whether the goals of the ACPA would be advanced by allowing 
suits against registrars for contributory cybersquatting.131 
A. Is Contributory Cybersquatting Liability Authorized by the 
Plain Text of the ACPA? 
The court split the question of whether the text of the ACPA 
authorizes a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting into 
two subcategories, first looking at the text in isolation, and then 
analyzing Congress’ intent in enacting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1)(A) 
and 1114(2)(D)(iii). 
The court’s first argument is that ACPA does not mention any 
forms of secondary liability and merely imposes civil liability for 
persons with “bad faith intent to profit” from a protected mark by 
“register[ing], traffic[king] in, or us[ing] a domain name.”132 It 
reasoned, by extending liability to registrars who are not 
themselves cybersquatters, one “would expand the range of 
conduct prohibited by the statute from a bad faith intent to 
cybersquat on a trademark to the mere maintenance of a domain 
name by a registrar, with or without a bad faith intent to profit.”133 
The court draws its main argument from Central Bank of Denver v. 
First Interstate Bank of Denver and Jack K. Naber, in which the 
                                                
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 550. 
 132 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)). 
 133 Id. at 550–51. 
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Supreme Court did not accept plaintiff’s assertion of an aiding and 
abetting claim under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.134 
They held, “[w]e cannot amend the statute to create liability for 
acts that are not themselves [prohibited] within the meaning of the 
statute.”135 because “when Congress enacts a statute under which a 
person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant for 
the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm, there is no 
general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and 
abettors.”136 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found that Congress’ intent could 
not have been to include secondary liability by pointing to a 
portion of Central Bank of Denver, which implies that Congress 
knew of secondary liability and its uses in traditional trademark 
law, but actively chose not to add such a provision in the statute.137 
Plaintiff-appellant also argued that the language in 
§ 1114(2)(D)(iii) indicates that § 1125(d)(1)(A) was intended to 
“create a cause of action for secondary liability.”138 In analyzing 
this argument, the court looked at the statute and concluded the 
specific § 1114(2)(D)(iii) “applies only to ‘this section,’” while 
§ 1114 “sets out remedies for the entire Lanham Act.”139 
                                                
 134 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 177–78 (1994) (“The issue, however, is not whether imposing private 
civil liability on aiders and abettors is good policy but whether aiding and 
abetting is covered by the statute;” . . . “The proscription does not include giving 
aid to a person who commits a manipulative or deceptive act.”); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j(b). 
 135 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177–78. 
 136 Id. at 182. 
 137 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 551; Pub. L. No. 106–113 (citing Cent. Bank, 511 
U.S. at 178 (“Congress knew how to impose [secondary] liability when it chose 
to do so.”)). 
 138 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 551. 
 139 Id.; U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iii) (“A domain name registrar, a domain name 
registry, or other domain name registration authority shall not be liable for 
damages under this section for the registration or maintenance of a domain name 
for another absent a showing of bad faith intent to profit from such registration 
or maintenance of the domain name.” (emphasis added)). 
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Finally, the court concluded that legislative history shows that 
§ 1114(2)(D)(iii) was intended to “codify the protection granted 
[to] registrars in Lockheed Martin Corp.”140 This was because 
Lockheed Martin Corp. “considered secondary liability of 
registrars for trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a).” 141  The court could thus not find anything that 
suggested intent from Congress to include “a cause of action for 
contributory cybersquatting” in § 1125(d).142 
B. A New and Distinct Course of Action 
The Ninth Circuit did not agree with the previous district court 
cases, or plaintiff-appellant, that Congress incorporated “the 
common law of trademark, including contributory infringement, 
into the ACPA.”143 The court once again relied on Central Bank of 
Denver which stated that there is “no general presumption that the 
plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors” when Congress enacts 
tort statutes relating to private defendants. 144  The court also 
disagreed with plaintiff-appellant’s argument, presuming that there 
must be statutory purpose to the contrary of long-established and 
familiar principles before deviating from the common law.145 
The court recognized that courts may infer a cause of action 
where “circumstances suggest that Congress intended to 
                                                
 140 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 551. 
 141 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 106–140 at 11; Lockheed Martin Corp., 141 F. 
Supp. 2d at 655 (“The bill, as amended, also promotes the continued ease and 
efficiency users of the current registration system enjoy by codifying current 
case law limiting the secondary liability of domain name registrars and registries 
for the act of registration of a domain name.”)). 
 142 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 551. 
 143 Id.; Verizon California, Inc. 881 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1176–79 (C.D. Cal. 
2011); Microsoft Corp. v. Shah, No. 10–0653, 2011 WL 108954, at *1–*3 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011); Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 
2d 1092, 1111–12 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 
177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 646–47 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 144 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 182 (1994)). 
 145 Id. 
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incorporate common law principles into a statute.”146 However, the 
court was not able to find such “circumstances” in this case.147 The 
differences between traditional Lanham Act claims and ACPA 
claims separate the ACPA from the accumulated common law that 
the Lanham Act is based upon.148 This is because the court read 
the ACPA as a “new statutory cause of action” created “to address 
a new problem: cybersquatting.”149 The purpose of the statute was, 
in other words, distinct from traditional trademark law because 
traditional trademark law “only restricts commercial use of 
another’s protected mark in order to avoid consumer confusion as 
to the source of a particular product.”150 Since the trademark 
owner must prove “bad faith” to find cybersquatting liability, “no 
analogous requirement exists for traditional trademark claims.”151 
The court further draws analogy to actions established by the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which the Ninth 
Circuit found to not be necessarily subject to the “same defenses 
available to traditional copyright claims.”152 
C. Furtherance of the Statute’s Goals 
The court next looked at the legislative history, which states 
that the ACPA was enacted to “protect consumers . . . and to 
provide clarity in the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the 
bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks.”153 The 
court’s interpretation of the Senate report was that the ACPA was 
“carefully and narrowly tailored” with the purpose to fix the 
                                                
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 553. 
 149 Id. at 552 (citing S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7) (noting that “[c]urrent law 
does not expressly prohibit the act of cybersquatting”). 
 150 Id.; see generally New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 
302, 305–06 (9th Cir. 1992); Bosley, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 151 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552–53. 
 152 Id.; MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 948 n.10 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
 153 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553 (citing S. REP. No. 106–140, at 4). 
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specific problem of cybersquatting.154 This view is strengthened by 
looking at the actual limitations included in the Act, namely the 
requirement for bad faith,155 and the narrow definition of who 
“uses” a domain name. 156  By broadening the Act to impose 
secondary liability, the scope of the Act would expand to a level 
that would “seriously undermine both these limiting provisions.”157 
The previous district court cases remedied this issue by 
requiring a plaintiff to show “exceptional circumstances.”158 The 
Ninth Circuit did not accept this solution, as it has “no basis in 
either the Act, or in the common law of trademark. Rather than 
attempt to cabin a judicially discovered cause of action for 
contributory cybersquatting with a limitation created out of whole 
cloth, we simply decline to recognize such a cause of action in the 
first place.”159 The last argument the court presented was the 
consideration of efficiency, specifically that the ACPA 
cybersquatting provision requires subjective bad faith, and the 
application of direct liability “spares neutral third party service 
providers from having to divine the intent of their customers.”160 It 
                                                
 154 S. REP. No. 106–140, at 12–13. 
 155 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 546, 553; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“A 
person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a 
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard 
to the goods or services of the parties, that person—has a bad faith intent to 
profit from that mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark 
under this section[.]” (emphasis added)). 
 156 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B) (2012) (“In determining whether a person 
has a bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider 
factors such as, but not limited to--”); § 1125(d)(1)(D) (“A person shall be liable 
for using a domain name under subparagraph (A) only if that person is the 
domain name registrant or that registrant’s authorized licensee.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 157 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553.  
 158 Id.; Verizon California, Inc. v. Above.com Pty Ltd., 881 F.Supp.2d 1173, 
1180 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Microsoft Corp v. Shah, No. C10-0653 RSM, 2011 WL 
108954, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011); Ford Motor Co. v. 
Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F.Supp.2d 635, 647 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 159 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553. 
 160 Id. 
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is thus more efficient to analyze a registrant’s subjective intent in 
relation to each domain, rather than having big corporations such 
as GoDaddy.com having to screen each registration.161 
The court regarded the ACPA’s explicitly listed remedies 
(excluding contributory liability) as sufficient for the purposes of 
fighting cybersquatting.162  This is strengthened by the in rem 
provision, which under certain conditions allows the trademark 
holder to sue the domain instead of the registrant in personam.163 
Trademark holders may also bring traditional or secondary 
trademark infringement claims that arise from cybersquatting 
activities.164 
V. IS THE PETROLIAM DECISION CORRECT? 
The Ninth Circuit did indeed take the safe route by remaining 
well within the literal text of the ACPA, leaving the future of 
contributory cybersquatting liability in the hands of Congress or 
the Supreme Court. 
Interestingly, the district courts in Ford Motor Co., Solid Host, 
Microsoft Corp., and Verizon California dared to do much more. 
One can easily reason that Congress would—and should 
have—included a secondary liability provision within the ACPA if 
that was its intent. This argument, however, is not immediately 
persuasive, because as the Ninth Circuit stated, the ACPA was 
enacted to address a specific problem that the current Lanham Act 
was unable to deal with. The issue of cybersquatting obviously did 
not exist before the enactment of the Lanham Act; in fact, it was 
not an issue until the 1990’s when the modern DNS caught on with 
the general public. Intellectual property laws are made to protect 
an industry segment that is constantly evolving. New technology 
often outrun statutory definitions. This is abused by infringers. 
                                                
 161 Id. (referencing that GoDaddy.com’s registrants holds over 50 million 
domains). 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2012). 
 164 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553. 
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Every tool available should be used to find an equitable solution. If 
relevant common law exists, it should not simply be discarded, but 
interpreted with the statute, in light of the dynamic technical 
landscape. The ACPA is a tool for trademark owners to stop 
cybersquatting; it gives courts the necessary authority to cancel or 
transfer the domain names to the trademark owners in situations 
where the registrant is not acting in commerce. The courts cannot 
allow themselves to look away from the massive trademark 
common law just because of this technicality. The fact that the in 
rem provision and the UDRP procedures are very effective in 
combating direct cybersquatting is not reason enough to deny the 
application of secondary liability where the contributor has had an 
active role in the primary cybersquatting activity. 
A. The Plain Text of ACPA 
The ACPA, like the Lanham Act for traditional trademarks, 
does not contain any explicit text for contributory liability. With 
regard to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A), the Petroliam appellate court 
emphasized that by holding registrars accountable, the “range of 
conduct prohibited by the statute from a bad faith intent to 
cybersquat on a trademark to the mere maintenance of a domain 
name by a registrar, with or without bad faith intent to profit” 
would be too substantial an expansion of the statute. 165 This 
interpretation is too restrictive. If anything, the district court’s 
interpretation follows a strict standard in which registrars, who are 
not acting in bad faith, cannot be held liable. Another issue with 
the Ninth Circuit’s justification is that its primary source is Central 
Bank of Denver, in which the Supreme Court stated that “Congress 
knew how to impose [secondary] liability when it chose to do 
so.”166 Central Bank of Denver involves a different issue: the 
general antifraud provision in the Securities Exchange Act 
(“SEA”) § 10(b). This provision presents substantially different 
                                                
 165 Id. at 150 (emphasis added). 
 166 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 
S.Ct. 1439, 1148 (1994). 
OCT 2015] Contributory Cybersquatting 111 
considerations than trademark law. 167  Trademark law, unlike 
securities law, is designed to protect owners’ trademarks from 
being misrepresented to the relevant consumer base. 
In examining the enactment of the Lanham Act back in 1946, 
why did the courts not end up with a similar result as in Central 
Bank of Denver when discussing the application of traditional 
contributory trademark infringement? The Inwood court did find 
contributory trademark infringement, even though the Lanham Act 
did not expressly justify its application. The short answer is that 
substantial common law supported such application. Substantial 
common law background was not an issue in Central Bank of 
Denver. To that, the Ninth Circuit argues contributory 
cybersquatting liability involves a new and distinct course of 
action.168 
As for the Ninth Circuit’s discussion regarding 
§ 1114(2)(D)(iii), the Ninth Circuit’s justification is principally 
correct. The provision clearly states “under this section,” but that 
only excludes § 1114(2)(D)(iii) specific applicability, as the Ninth 
Circuit infers that this is an argument against applying secondary 
liability in cybersquatting cases, the provision just as much proves 
the opposite. Neither § 1114(2)(D)(iii) or any other provision in 
the Lanham Act expressly denies the applicability of contributory 
liability. It is unclear why the section should be treated in isolation 
from the rest of the section. The provision is not in a vacuum; it 
indirectly shows Congress’ intent and consideration of applying 
secondary liability in certain scenarios. 
It makes sense to apply the provision analogically to situations 
that are not mentioned in the provision. For example, it should 
apply to situations where the registrars’ primary functions go 
beyond registration or maintenance of domain names. The 
registrars’ safe harbor is intended for actions made as a registrar 
and not for profit-generating side businesses such as 
                                                
 167 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2012). 
 168 See infra Part V.B. 
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WHOIS-masking and domain parking services. Furthermore, the 
provision clearly states that the registrars indeed are liable for 
registration and maintenance of domain names if found to have had 
“bad faith intent.” This shows Congress’ clear intent of holding 
dishonest registrars liable. 
B. New and Distinct Course of Action 
The appellant-defendant relied on Inwood and the application 
of contributory liability for trademark infringement under the 
Lanham Act.169 The fact that Congress legislated against this legal 
background and placed the ACPA within the Lanham Act, shows 
that the intention must have been to include a cause of action for 
contributory cybersquatting.170 The appellate court, admitted that 
even by relying on Bank of Denver, which infers that there “is no 
general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and 
abettors,” “courts can infer such a cause of action where 
circumstances suggest that Congress intended to incorporate 
common law principles into [the Lanham Act].”171 The Ninth 
Circuit however, would not find circumstances regarding the 
enactment of the ACPA that supports an argument of Congress’ 
intent of incorporating theories of secondary liability into that 
Act.172 This is because the Ninth Circuit claimed “the ACPA did 
not result from the codification of common law, much less 
common law that included a cause of action for secondary 
liability”; rather the ACPA was created to deal with a new, specific 
problem, cybersquatting, and thus created a new statutory cause of 
                                                
 169 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553. 
 170 Id. (citing United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)) (“Statutes 
which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring 
the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory 
purpose to the contrary is evident.”) (citations omitted). 
 171 Bank of Denver, 114 S.Ct. at 1451; Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 
456 U.S. 844, n.2 (1982). 
 172 Bank of Denver, 114 S.Ct. at 1452. 
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action.173 The Ninth Circuit supports its decision and relies on both 
the substantial history behind the Lanham Act, originating from 
English common law, 174  and the law review article The 
Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, which states that “the 
Lanham Act’s primary, express purpose was to codify the existing 
common law of trademarks and not to create any new trademark 
rights.”175 
The Court claims that the ACPA has distinct purposes that 
differ from traditional trademark law, and thus must have distinct 
elements.176 The main argument is that traditional trademark law 
prohibits commercial acts that infringe on another’s mark in order 
to avoid source-identifying consumer confusion.177 For finding 
cybersquatting liability, there is no requirement that the acts be “in 
commerce,” but rather there must be “bad faith intent to profit.”178 
Since traditional trademark law has no analogous requirement, the 
Ninth Circuit concludes that “bad faith intent to profit” is to be 
considered a distinct course of action.179 
It is hard to argue against the fact that the ACPA is a new 
action per se. It is an action created to deal with a new type of 
infringement, cybersquatting, which did not exist at the enactment 
of the Lanham Act. However, common law is not static. Many 
cybersquatters do not act “in commerce” as there is no requirement 
for registrants to act in commerce to register domains (unlike for 
                                                
 173 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552 (citing S. REP. No. 106–140, at 7 (“noting that 
‘[c]urrent law does not expressly prohibit the act of cybersquatting’”)). 
 174 Id.; see also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1115, 1122 
(2003). 
 175 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552 (citing Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of 
Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV. 519, 520 (1993)). 
 176 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552. 
 177 Id.; see also New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 
305–06 (9th Cir.1992); Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680 
(9th Cir. 2005). 
 178 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B) (2012) (stating a 
person is “liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark” if that person has a 
“bad faith intent to profit from that mark”).  
 179 Petroliam, 717 F.3d at 553. 
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registering trademarks). It is also much cheaper and easier to 
register multiple domain names, unlike trademarks. 180  For 
example, a person, not acting in commerce, who registers a 
dot-com domain of a famous mark, and subsequently points the 
domain to explicit and obscene pornographic materials would be 
regarded as tarnishing and/or diluting the mark. Why should 
liability not be imposed on him, when his friend who acts in 
commerce (such as selling such merchandise across state borders) 
could be held liable? 
The fact that the ACPA implements liability on “bad faith” 
instead of “in commerce” does not necessarily create a new cause 
of action. It rests on the same fundamental foundations, to protect 
the consumer from confusion as to the source of goods or services. 
“Bad faith” in the cybersquatting context infers a will to profit 
from the domain, similarly to someone “acting in commerce.” The 
addition of the ACPA is merely a tool for the courts to be able to 
incur liability of cybersquatters without running afoul with the 
general wording of the Lanham Act, which was enacted almost 
seventy years ago. 
C. Furtherance of the Statute’s Goals 
The Ninth Circuit claims that the legislative history and the Act 
in itself entail a narrow interpretation that precludes cybersquatting 
secondary liability. By looking at the Act in isolation, the analysis 
above shows that it warrants an expansive and analogic 
interpretation.181 In analyzing the Senate Report, it is also difficult 
to support the Ninth Circuit’s argument. The Report states that: 
The bill is carefully and narrowly tailored, however, to extend only to 
cases where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant registered, 
trafficked in, or used the offending domain name with bad-faith intent 
to profit from the goodwill of a mark belonging to someone else. Thus, 
                                                
 180 An interesting side note could be made towards regulation of the .no 
(Norwegian country code TLD), which until June 1, 2014 required every 
registrant to provide an organization number in order to register domain names. 
A direct result of this was that all registrants acted in commerce. 
 181 See supra Part V.A. 
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the bill does not extent [sic] to innocent domain name registrations by 
those who are unaware of another’s use of the name, or even to 
someone who is aware o the trademark status of the name but registers 
a domain name containing the mark for any reason other than with bad 
faith intent to profit from the goodwill associated with that mark.182 
Congress’ aim with this is to limit the application to the 
registrant’s bad faith registration. It is “carefully and narrowly” 
tailored in the sense that registrants who are not registering the 
domain name in bad faith should not be liable. It does not address 
excluding secondary liability as the Ninth Circuit claims. The goal 
of the statute is to provide the courts an effective tool against 
cybersquatters (people not acting in commerce), who act with bad 
faith intent to profit on other’s marks. The Act is “carefully and 
narrowly” tailored to not catch people registering domain names in 
good faith. That is it. 
It is counterintuitive to presume that registrars knowingly 
contributing to primary cybersquatting activity get carte blanche to 
do so, by the mere fact that Congress has stated people registering 
domain names in good faith are outside of the ACPA’s scope. 
In an effort to harmonize the ACPA with traditional trademark 
infringement rules, the district courts in Verizon California, 
Microsoft Corp., and Ford Motor Co. required a showing of 
“exceptional circumstances.” 183  The Ninth Circuit claims the 
exceptional circumstance test “has no basis in either the Act, or in 
the common law of trademark.”184 Both the ACPA and Lanham 
Act are mute about contributory liability, so it is not sensible for 
Congress to have included the words “exceptional circumstances.” 
It is also strange that the Court would mention the common law of 
trademark, as it already concluded the ACPA is a new and distinct 
course of action, rending the common law of trademarks irrelevant. 
                                                
 182 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 12–13. 
 183 See Verizon California, Inc. v. Above.com Pty Ltd., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 
1178 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Microsoft Corp v. Shah, No. C10-0653 RSM, 2011 WL 
108954, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011) ; Ford Motor Co. v. 
Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp.2d 635, 647 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 184 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553. 
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The separation of powers dictates that it is up to Congress to 
enact laws. A federal court may not lightly create common law 
rights; it must exercise its authority to fill interstitial gaps to 
effectuate the statutory pattern enacted by Congress.185 The Ford 
Motor Co. and Solid Host “exceptional circumstance” test is a way 
to fill an interstitial gap. It was clear that Namecheap sufficiently 
monitored and controlled its services, but for the court not to 
exceed its powers and overstep Congress’ intent Namecheap would 
have to positively know that the domain had been stolen before 
placing contributory liability. This fits well into the realm of 
traditional trademark infringement and the Lanham Act because it 
aligns analogically with Inwood and the 20-plus years of decisions 
finding contributory trademark infringement without intervention 
by Congress. Namecheap continued to supply the anonymity 
service, even though it knew it was being used to cybersquat. The 
considerations are inherently similar. 
The Ninth Circuit asserts, “[l]imiting claims under the Act to 
direct liability is also consistent with the ACPA’s goal of ensuring 
that trademark holders can acquire and use domain names without 
having to pay ransom money to cybersquatters.”186 The last part of 
the statement is sensible. The ACPA’s main purpose and weight 
rests on the ability for mark owners to get squatted domain names 
returned or cancelled. However, this does not exclude the assertion 
of secondary liability of registrars acting outside of the core 
registrar services (such as registering and maintaining domain 
                                                
 185 See Hooven v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 465 F.3d 566, 573 n.5 (3rd Cir. 2006); 
see also Donald L. Doernberg, Juridical Chameleons in the “New Erie” Canal, 
1990 UTAH L. REV. 759, 761 (1990) (“The Article concludes with the 
suggestion that federal courts have considerable common law powers, which, 
rather than being inconsistent with separation of powers, actually function to 
make exercises of congressional power more effective. Separation of powers is 
not offended when federal courts create common law, provided that these efforts 
are constrained by expressions of policy in positive law, the Constitution and 
federal statutes.”). 
 186 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553. 
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names)187 and that are aware of and contribute to cybersquatting 
activity. The interests of registrars should not preempt a mark 
owner’s right to pursue contributory infringing activity. 
This Article does not demand that registrars “have to divine the 
intent of their customers,” but rather to be attentive when receiving 
notification of cybersquatting activity by mark owners. 188 
Although different in many key aspects, primarily by the fact the 
Act clearly authorize its applicability, one may look to the DMCA 
limitations on liability relating to material online, which 
indemnifies service providers for hosting infringing materials 
when promptly removing the infringing material upon discovery or 
notification.189 The Ninth Circuit’s fears of imposing registrars to 
“trademark and domain name disputes” is simply not realistic by 
the heightened standard set by the “exceptional circumstance” 
test.190 
VI. CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is intriguing, and on many levels 
persuasive. It remains well within the literal letter of the statute, 
leaving the matter for the Supreme Court or Congress to decide. 
The Ninth Circuit has done its job well within its discretion, so 
why argue against its holding? 
The Supreme Court in Brown v. Duchesne, in 1856, stated “it is 
well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court will not look 
merely to a particular clause in which general words may be 
used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute . . . and 
the objects and policy of the law.”191 This principle was further 
elaborated in Bob Jones which made it clear that “[i]t is a 
well-established canon of statutory construction that a court should 
go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that 
                                                
 187 See also 15 U.S.C. § 1114(D)(iii) (2012) (safe harbor provision). 
 188 Id.  
 189 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2012). 
 190 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553. 
 191 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 194 (1856). 
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language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute.”192 Both 
the objectives and policy considerations behind the ACPA and the 
Lanham Act conform to an expanded interpretation in support of 
contributory cybersquatting liability. 
Although the Ninth Circuit abstained from discussing the 
“exceptional circumstance” test in Petroliam, the registrar acted 
less culpably than in Solid Host and Microsoft Corp., this suggests 
that any reasonable court, by applying the “exceptional 
circumstance” test, might have found GoDaddy.com not liable for 
contributory cybersquatting. The Court’s wording in Petroliam 
effectively removed any hope for mark owner to get remedy 
against registrars contributing to cybersquatting in the Ninth 
Circuit. As discussed in Part V, this is unreasonably strict, 
considering the reason for imposing such secondary liability. 
It is easy to imagine situations where a registrar should be held 
accountable for contributing to cybersquatting. The harm done to a 
famous trademark, such as by directing unknowing consumers to 
pornographic and other obscene websites, can be massive. This 
loss, in many cases, cannot be recovered from the primary 
cybersquatter as either in personam jurisdiction is unobtainable, or 
the defendant simply lacks the funds to cover profits, damages and 
legal costs, 193  or the maximum of $100,000 of statutory 
damages.194 
The threshold for imposing liability should be high, but 
present, so as to function as a motivator for registrars to avoid 
actively contributing to cybersquatting. Registrars conducting their 
regular core businesses, such as registering domain names and 
maintaining their records should never lead to liability.195 For a 
registrar to risk secondary cybersquatting liability a plaintiff should 
have to prove that: (1) someone registered a domain name with 
“bad faith intent to profit;” (2) the domain name registrar is acting 
                                                
 192 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983). 
 193 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). 
 194 Id. § 1117(d). 
 195 See id. § 1114(D)(iii) (2012). 
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outside of its core functions of registering and maintaining domain 
names, as by offering services such as WHOIS-masking or domain 
forwarding; and (3) the existence of “exceptional circumstances.” 
Such circumstances might be the registrar actively inducing the 
cybersquatting activity, such as by marketing services that helps 
the cybersquatters more efficiently squat on domains and 
trademarks alike, as seen in Microsoft Corp.196 It might also entail 
more passive contribution or facilitation, such as hiding the 
cybersquatter’s identity by publishing the cybersquatter’s own 
information in the WHOIS record rather than the registrant’s. 
There should be no passive contribution, unless the situation of 
offering such services would have led a normal and prudent person 
to conclude that the domain in question was squatted. This Essay 
does not contend that services going outside the scope of 
registering and maintaining domain names should automatically be 
viewed as bad faith or unlawful. Both WHOIS-masking and 
domain forwarding are practical tools that primarily serve 
legitimate purposes. As such, a registrar should only be liable 
when sufficiently notified by a mark owner of specific illicit use. 
The Ninth Circuit rests its holding on efficiency considerations, 
namely that the ACPA cybersquatting provision requires 
subjective bad faith, and the application of direct liability “spares 
neutral third party service providers from having to divine the 
intent of their customers.”197 The Court uses the words “neutral 
third party,” but how can the cases as analyzed above, and the 
above several hypotheticals signify a “neutral third party”? 
Admittedly, the registrars act in varying levels of involvement and 
guilt, but it must be underlined that registrars very well may 
behave directly culpably and should be held contributorially liable. 
Major registrars such as GoDaddy.com have already 
implemented steps to counter the likelihood of secondary 
cybersquatting liability when offering services such as 
                                                
 196 See Microsoft Corp v. Shah, No. C10-0653 RSM, 2011 WL 108954, at *2 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011). 
 197 Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553. 
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WHOIS-masking and sponsored domain-parking services by 
including various provisions in their service agreements. The 
GoDaddy.com’s Domain Name Proxy Agreement authorizes 
GoDaddy.com to disclose personal information to “[r]esolve any 
and all third party claims, whether threatened or made, arising out 
of [the registrants] use of a domain name for which [GoDaddy.com 
subsidiary company, Domains By Proxy, LLC] is the registrant 
listed in the “Whois” directory on [the registrant’s] behalf.”198 As 
for sponsored domain parking, which GoDaddy.com calls 
“Cashparking,” GoDaddy.com clearly states in its Service 
Agreement that they “reserve the right to screen domain names 
prior to enrollment and . . . may exclude, in [its] sole discretion, 
any domain name for any reason, including, but not limited to: a) 
violation of this Agreement or the Universal Terms of Service; or 
b) infringement, or potential infringement, of a third party 
intellectual property right.”199 GoDaddy.com, in its various service 
agreements, refers to their general trademark policies that list an 
email address to contact to claim a trademark violation and 
GoDaddy.com’s subsequent investigation procedures. This shows 
a great willingness to take trademark infringement and 
cybersquatting seriously and to find progressive solutions when 
available, without the mark owner having to initiate UDRP or 
ACPA proceedings against the direct cybersquatter or the domain 
in rem. This depicts a substantially different image than the Ninth 
Circuit portrays in Petronas. 
GoDaddy.com’s license agreements are a progressive example 
of how registrars can avoid secondary cybersquatting liability 
altogether. It shows how little effort it takes. As mentioned above, 
                                                
 198  See Domain Name Proxy Agreement Section 4.ii, GODADDY 
http://www.godaddy.com/agreements/showdoc.aspx?pageid=DOMAIN_NAME
PROXY (last visited Aug. 29, 2015). 
 199  See CASHPARKING® SERVICE AGREEMENT Section 2 GODADDY 
https://in.godaddy.com/agreements/ShowDoc.aspx?se=%2B&pageid=Cash_Par
k_SA (last visited Aug. 29, 2015) (emphasis added) (Cashparking is basically a 
default site provided by GoDaddy.com when registering domain names that 
contains advertisements whereas the registrant is paid based on traffic). 
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the inherent justification behind trademark law is the protection of 
consumers. By helping or inducing cybersquatters to make money 
by sponsored domain parking services, it is ultimately the 
consumer who loses both time and money trying to navigate to the 
correct website. Another loser is the mark owners, who have to 
police their marks and spend considerable amount of money 
towards UDRP proceedings and federal court proceedings. The 
additional cost imposed by the registrars’ services such as domain 
masking and sponsored domain parking ultimately shifts to the 
consumer, as the product cost is increased as a measure to offset 
the policing cost. 
It is only fair that some of this cost is transferred to the 
registrars who choose to go outside of the core services such as 
registering and maintaining domain names. 
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